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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM: THEORETICAL ASPECT

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The report touches upon the institutional aspect of the mega-level of global economic system from theoretical perspective.

John Mearsheimer underlines that **cooperation takes place in a world that is competitive at its core** - one where states have powerful incentives to take advantage of other states. This point is graphically highlighted by European politics in the forty years before World War I. There was much cooperation among the great powers during this period, but that did not stop them from going to war in 1914 [5].

It is necessary to mention that Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal in the beginning of their publication note that **major institutions are organized in radically different ways**. Some are global, essentially open to all states; others are regional, with restricted memberships. Some institutions give each state an equal vote, whereas others have weighted voting and sometimes require supermajorities. Institutions may have relatively strong central authorities and significant operating responsibilities or be little more than forums for consultation [4].

In the joint research of Alexander Thompson and Duncan Snidal it is stated that "the modern history of international organization reflects an uneven development of both the practice and concept that go under that name. The term is used in differing ways and we apply it to both international organizations conceived as formal institutional organizations and in a more general sense of order creation. Furthermore, international organization includes not only interstate arrangements but, increasingly, arrangements among non-governmental and transnational actors. Thus, the landscape of international organizations includes both inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). International organization is clearly a very broad concept, which has evolved with the practice of various forms of international governance [6].

Similarly, theorists and practitioners have employed a number of differing conceptions of 'international organization'. These conceptions can usefully be thought of as falling into three categories: international organizations as formal organization, international organizations as ordering principle in the international system, and international organizations as regime. The last of these categories has received the most attention recently and has involved a high degree of fruitful theorizing about international organizations and international cooperation more generally [6].

As Robert O. Keohane argues, international regimes can be interpreted, in part, as devices to facilitate the making of substantive agreements in world politics, particularly among states. Regimes facilitate agreements by **providing rules, norms, principles, and procedures** that help actors to overcome barriers to agreement identified by economic theories of market failure. That is, regimes make it easier for actors **to realize their interests collectively** [3].

For example, Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal are concerned with the concrete structure operations of particular organizations, and they also see international organizations as complex phenomena implicate several lines of international relations theory. From this vantage they identify two functional characteristics that lead states, in appropriate stances, to prefer international organizations to alternate forms of institutionalization. These are **centralization and independence**. International organizations allow for the centralization of collective activities through a concrete organizational structure and a supportive administrative apparatus [1].

These increase the efficiency of collective activities and enhance the organization's ability to affect the understandings, environment, and interests of states. *Independence* means the ability to act with a degree of autonomy within defined spheres. It often entails the capacity to operate as a neutral in managing interstate disputes and conflicts. International organizations independence is highly constrained: **member states, especially the powerful, can limit the autonomy of international organizations, interfere with their operations, ignore their dictates, or restructure and dissolve them**. But as in many private transactions, participation by even a partially autonomous, neutral actor can increase efficiency and affect the legitimacy of individual and collective actions. This provides even powerful states with incentives to grant international organizations substantial independence. *The broad categories of centralization and independence encompass numerous specific functions*. Most international organizations perform more than one, though each has its own unique combination [1].

The signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, reinforced by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, established the principle of national sovereignty, thereby placing

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the states of Europe on equal legal footing. This notion of sovereign equality — endowing each state with territorial integrity and the right to conduct domestic and foreign affairs without outside intervention - represents the first real ordering principle among states. After Westphalia, 'decentralized control by sovereign states' provided the basis for a horizontal international order critical to the subsequent development of international organization. However, it was not until the nineteenth century that actual international organizations began to appear in significant numbers. Though the advent of states as sovereign political units was an important step, preconditions for the creation of international organizations were not met during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries [6].

The first serious attempt at formal international organization arose with the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), which established diplomatic foundations for a new European security order following the devastation of the Napoleonic Wars [6].

Many policymakers as well as academics believe that institutions hold great promise for promoting international peace. There are serious problems with the causal logic of each theory, and little empirical evidence for any of them. What is most impressive about institutions, in fact, is how little independent effect they seem to have had on state behavior [5].

Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal do not enumerate every such function or provide a comprehensive typology. Instead, they highlight several of the most important. They focus especially on the active functions of international organizations' facilitating the negotiation and implementation of agreements, resolving disputes, managing conflicts, carrying out operational activities like technical assistance, elaborating norms, shaping international discourse, and the like — that international relations theory has only sparingly addressed. Rational states will use or create a formal international organizations when the value of these functions outweighs the costs, notably the resulting limits on unilateral action [1]. *The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it* [5].

R.O. Keohane concludes that regimes can be used to pursue particularistic and parochial interests, as well as more widely shared objectives. They do not necessarily increase overall levels of welfare. Even when they do, conflicts among units will continue. States will attempt to force the burdens of adapting to change onto one another. Nevertheless, as long as the situations involved are not constant-sum, actors will have incentives to coordinate their behavior, implicitly or explicitly, in order to achieve greater collective benefits without reducing the utility of any unit. When such incentives exist, and when sufficient interdependence exists that ad hoc agreements are insufficient, opportunities will arise for the development of international regimes. If international regimes did not exist, they would surely have to be invented [3].

Let's focus on ***varieties of institutionalist theories***. There are three institutionalist theories, and each offers a different argument about how institutions push states away from war and help foster stability [5].

Liberal institutionalism is the least ambitious of the three theories. It does not directly address the important question of how to prevent war, but focuses instead on explaining why economic and environmental cooperation among states is more likely than realists recognize. Increased cooperation in those realms is presumed to reduce the likelihood of war, although liberal institutionalists do not explain how. The theory is predicated on the belief that cheating is the main inhibitor of international cooperation, and that institutions provide the key to overcoming that problem. The aim is to create rules that constrain states, but not to challenge the fundamental realist claim that states are self-interested actors [5].

Collective security directly confronts the issue of how to prevent war. The theory starts with the assumption that force will continue to matter in world politics, and that states will have to guard against potential aggressors. However, the threat of war can be greatly reduced, according to the theory, by challenging realist thinking about state behaviour, and substituting in its place three anti-realist norms. First, states should reject the idea of using force to change the status quo. Second, to deal with states that violate that norm and threaten (or start) a war, responsible states must not act on the basis of their own narrow self-interest. Rather, they must suppress the temptation to respond in whatever way would maximize their individual gains, and instead automatically join together to present the aggressor with the threat of overwhelming force. Third, states must trust each other to renounce aggression and to mean that renunciation. They must also be confident that other states will come to their rescue, should they become the target of aggression [5].

Critical theory is the most ambitious of the theories, as its ultimate aim is to transform the fundamental nature of international politics and to create a world where there is not just increased cooperation among states, but the possibility of genuine peace [5].

It is also necessary to agree with R.O. Keohane that several assertions of structural theories appear problematic. In particular, it is less clear that hegemony is a necessary condition for stable international regimes under all circumstances. Past patterns of institutionalized cooperation may be able to compensate, to some extent, for increasing fragmentation of power [3].

Interestingly, Marx is back as an intellectual force to be reckoned with. This is not only because there are some uncanny parallels between his own times and our own — both periods of huge technological, socio-economic, and political turmoil and transformation. More fundamentally, Marx's forensic examination of both the

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extraordinary dynamism and inherent contradictions of capitalism has arguably never been improved upon. Its great strength is that it allows us to see how so many apparently different crises and instances of resistance, from the global to the most personal and local, link together [2].

Given, however, the richness and variety of Marxist thinking about world politics, the account that follows is inevitably destined to be partial and to some extent arbitrary. Our aim is to provide a route map that we hope will encourage readers to explore further the work of Marx and of those who have built on the foundations he laid [2].

The essential elements of Marxist theories of world politics. First, all the theorists share with Marx the view that the social world should be analysed as a totality. The academic division of the social world into different areas of enquiry — history, philosophy, economics, political science, sociology, international relations, etc. — is both arbitrary and unhelpful. None can be understood without knowledge of the others: the social world has to be studied as a whole. Given the scale and complexity of the social world, this exhortation clearly makes great demands of the analyst. Nonetheless, for Marxist theorists, the disciplinary boundaries that characterize the contemporary social sciences need to be transcended if we are to generate a proper understanding of the dynamics of world politics [2].

It is certainly true that developments in the economic base act as a catalyst for the broader transformation of society as a whole. This is because, as Marx argues in the Preface to his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, ‘the mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general’. Thus, the legal, political, and cultural institutions and practices of a given society reflect and reinforce — in a more or less mediated form — the pattern of power and control in the economy [2].

As we can see, Stephen Hobden and Richard Wyn Jones’s chapter on “Marxist theories of international relations” discusses how Marxist approaches, like world-systems theory, Gramscian theory, and the Frankfurt School, view international relations through the lens of global capitalism and class struggle. Key concepts include economic structures shaping global events, the historical role of class conflict, and how capitalism's inherent contradictions drive change and create global inequality.

Marx internationalized: from imperialism to world-systems theory. At the start of the twentieth century a number of writers took on the task of developing analyses that incorporated the implications of capitalism’s transborder characteristics, in particular imperialism. Rosa Luxemburg was a major contributor to these debates. Her 1913 book, *The Accumulation of Capital*, argued that by analysing capitalism as a closed system, Marx had overlooked the central role

played by the colonies. In order to survive, Luxemburg argued, capitalism constantly needed to expand into non-capitalist areas. A 1917 pamphlet by Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, made similar arguments [2].

Lenin's views were taken up by the Latin American Dependency School, adherents of which developed the notion of core and periphery in greater depth. In particular, Raúl Prebisch (1949) argued that countries in the periphery were suffering as a result of what he called 'the declining terms of trade'. He suggested that the price of manufactured goods increased more rapidly than that of raw materials.

Other writers such as André Gunder Frank (1967) and Henrique Fernando Cardoso (who was President of Brazil from 1995 to 2003) developed this analysis further to show how the development of less industrialized countries was directly 'dependent' on the more advanced capitalist societies. It is from the framework developed by such writers that contemporary world-systems theory emerged.

World-systems theory is particularly associated with the work of Immanuel Wallerstein (1930–2019). In terms of the geography of the modern world system, in addition to a core–periphery distinction, Wallerstein added an intermediate semi-periphery, which displays certain features characteristic of the core and others characteristic of the periphery. Although dominated by core economic interests, the semi-periphery has its own relatively vibrant indigenously owned industrial base. Because of this hybrid nature, the semi-periphery plays important economic and political roles in the modern world system. In particular, it provides a source of labour that counteracts any upward pressure on wages in the core. It also offers a new home for those industries that can no longer function profitably in the core (e.g. car assembly and textiles). The semi-periphery plays a vital role in stabilizing the political structure of the world system [2]. The phenomena evoked by 'globalization' are manifestations of a world system that emerged in Europe during the sixteenth century to incorporate the entire globe: a world system now in terminal decline [2].

Gramscianism. Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) was a Sardinian and one of the founding members of the Italian Communist Party. He was jailed in 1926 for his political activities and spent the remainder of his life in prison. His intellectual legacy has been transmitted primarily through his remarkable *Prison Notebooks*. The key question that animated Gramsci's theoretical work was: why had it proven to be so difficult to promote revolution in Western Europe? After all, Marx had predicted that revolution, and the transition to socialism, would occur first in the most advanced capitalist societies. Gramsci's answer revolved around his use of the concept of hegemony, his understanding of which reflected his broader conceptualization of power [2].

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Gramsci used the term 'historic bloc' to describe the mutually reinforcing and reciprocal relationships between the socioeconomic relations (base) and political and cultural practices (superstructure) that together underpin a given order. For Gramsci and Gramscians, to reduce analysis to the narrow consideration of economic relationships on the one hand, or solely to politics and ideas on the other, is deeply mistaken. It is their interaction that matters [2].

It was the Canadian scholar **Robert W. Cox** (1926–2018) who arguably did most to introduce Gramsci to the study of world politics. He developed a Gramscian approach that involves both a critique of prevailing theories of international relations and international political economy, and the development of an alternative framework for the analysis of world politics. 'Theory is always for someone, and for some purpose' (R. Cox 1981: 128). It expresses a worldview that follows logically from the Gramscian, and broader Marxist, position that has been explored in this chapter. If ideas and values are (ultimately) a reflection of a particular set of social relations, and are transformed as those relations are themselves transformed, then this suggests that all knowledge (of the social world at least) must reflect a certain context, a certain time, a certain space. Knowledge, in other words, cannot be objective and timeless in the sense that some contemporary realists, for example, would like to claim.

According to Robert W. Cox, successive dominant powers in the international system have shaped a world order that suits their interests, and have done so not only as a result of their coercive capabilities, but also because they have managed to generate broad consent for that order, even among those who are disadvantaged by it [2]. The degree to which a state can successfully produce and reproduce its hegemony is an indication of the extent of its power. The success of the United States in gaining worldwide acceptance for neoliberalism suggests just how dominant the current hegemon has become. But despite the dominance of the present world order, Cox did not expect it to remain unchallenged. Rather, he maintained Marx's view that capitalism is an inherently unstable system, riven by inescapable contradictions. Inevitable economic crises will act as a catalyst for the emergence of counter-hegemonic movements [2].

Critical theory. Both Gramscianism and critical theory have their roots in Western Europe in the 1920s and 1930s — a place and a time in which Marxism was forced to come to terms not only with the failure of a series of attempted revolutionary uprisings, but also with the rise of fascism. Critical theorists, have involved themselves with questions concerning international society, international ethics, and security.

Critical theory developed out of the work of the Frankfurt School. This was an extraordinarily talented group of thinkers who began to work together in the 1920s and 1930s. As left-wing German Jews, the members of the school were forced into

exile by the Nazis' rise to power in the early 1930s, and much of their most creative work was produced in the US [2]. The first point to note is that their intellectual concerns are rather different from those of most other Marxists: they have not been much interested in the further development of analysis of the economic base of society. They have instead concentrated on questions relating to culture, bureaucracy, the social basis and nature of authoritarianism, and the structure of the family, and on exploring such concepts as reason and rationality as well as theories of knowledge. Frankfurt School theorists have been particularly innovative in terms of their analysis of the role of the media, and what they have famously termed the 'culture industry'. In other words, in classical Marxist terms, the focus of critical theory is almost entirely superstructural.

Andrew Linklater has developed critical theory themes to argue in favour of the expansion of the moral boundaries of the political community, and has pointed to the European Union as an example of a post-Westphalian institution of governance.

New Marxism. 'New Marxists' are Marxists who have returned to the fundamental tenets of Marxist thought and sought to reappropriate ideas that they regard as having been neglected or somehow misinterpreted by subsequent generations. On this basis, they have sought both to criticize other developments in Marxism, and to make their own original theoretical contributions to the understanding of contemporary trends. The most outstanding advocate of what one might term 'the return to Marx' is the geographer David Harvey, whose explorations and explanations of Marx's masterpiece *Capital* have reached an enormous online audience as well as being published in book form. In another important contribution, Kevin B. Anderson's *Marx at the Margins* (2010) focuses on Marx's little-known writing on the world politics of his day to recover his ideas about nationalism, ethnicity, and race [2].

Uneven and combined development suggests that rather than all countries following a single path of economic and political development, each country's path will be affected by the international context [2].

Evidently, common concerns and methodology among political scientists, legal scholars and economists increasingly characterize the literature on international organizations. More than ever before, international legal scholars are using modes of analysis drawn from political science and economics to understand international organizations and law. This interdisciplinary movement is clearly evident in substantive work on compliance with international rules and on dispute settlement. Scholars from various traditions have come together to understand why nations comply with international law and institutional rules, as well as the development of supranational adjudication in international organizations. Through this intellectual interaction, the study of international organization, like the practice of international governance itself, is becoming more energized and, one hopes, more sophisticated [6].

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It is essential to agree that for several decades, states have taken international organizations more seriously than have scholars [1]. Whereas formal international organizations have been seriously neglected in the theoretical study of international regimes, they have played a major role in many, if not most, instances of interstate collaboration. By taking advantage of the centralization and independence of international organizations, states are able to achieve goals that they cannot accomplish on a decentralized basis. In some circumstances, the role of international organizations extends even further to include development of common norms and practices that help define, or refine, themselves. At the same time, because issues of power and distribution are pervasive, states are wary of allowing international organizations too much autonomy. Thus, international organizations provide an important supplement to decentralized cooperation that affects the nature and performance of the international system. Scholars must take international organizations more seriously if they are to understand interstate relations [1].

Although scholars have presented the case for the importance of formal institutions in international cooperation, the shortcomings of many actual organizations go without saying. In addition, in emphasizing the possibilities for formal organizations, we should not ignore the difficulty and even impossibility of some of the tasks that are presented to them. Despite these severe limitations, the fact that international organizations have not been abandoned by states is testimony to both their actual value and their perhaps greater potential. A better theoretical and empirical understanding of formal organizations should help improve their performance [1].

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